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IN SEARCH OF AN INTERNATIONAL SOLUTION TO
BRIBERY: THE IMPACT OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT OF 1977 ON CORPORATE BEHAVIOR
I.

INTRODUCTION

By enacting the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977' (FCPA),
Congress expected that the practice of United States corporations
bribing influential foreign officials in order to obtain favorable
treatment, including lucrative contracts, from those governments
would cease. Furthermore, Congress designed the FCPA to
strengthen the United States' position in negotiations concerning
bilateral and multilateral antibribery agreements and to reinforce
the "bedrock elements of our system of corporate disclosure and
accountability." 2 The FCPA seeks to accomplish its purposes (1)
through the criminalization of certain forms of foreign bribery
committed by United States citizens, corporations and other entities and (2) through the imposition of accounting standards and
internal controls upon reporting companies under the Securities
Exchange Act of 19343 (Exchange Act).4
Since enactment, the FCPA has been criticized for its ambiguity, pitfalls, and underlying policy weakness. 5 For instance, a payment of $10,000 to a customs official by X Corporation in order to
speed a shipment of perishables through customs would be a legal
facilitating payment under the FCPA. Under the same circumstances, however, a $100 payment to a Cabinet minister who has
the discretionary power to clear the shipment will subject the X
Corporation to a million dollar fine and expose the guilty company
1. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, Title I, 91 Stat.
1494-1498, effective December 19, 1977 (to be codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a note,
78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff) [hereinafter cited as FCPA].
2. 123 CONG. REG. § 19399 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
3. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77, 78 (1976)).
4. Title II of Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1498-1500, the Domestic and Foreign
Investment Improved Disclosure Act of 1977 requires that those who acquire in
excess of five percent of the beneficial ownership of the stock of a registered
company must file detailed reports with the SEC. This Note omits detailed discussion of that Title.
5. See Popkin, Read this Article: ForAll You "Know", You May be Violating
the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct, 1 MID. EAST EXEC. R. 3 (1978); Estey and
Marston, Pitfalls (and Loopholes) in the ForeignBribery Law, FORTUNE, October
9, 1978 at 182.
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officer, director or employee to a jail term of up to five years for
violating the FCPA.
This Note will explore the background of the FCPA, the policy
behind its enactment, and will provide a detailed discussion of
problem areas within the law. Furthermore, a general discussion
of how corporate counsel may provide adequate safeguards so as
to reasonably comply with the FCPA will be included. Finally, the
international efforts to eradicate bribery of government officials of
all countries will be detailed.
II.

HISTORY OF THE LEGISLATION

During the Watergate Committee hearings and the Special
Prosecutor's investigation, it was revealed that several United
States corporations had made illegal political contributions in the
United States.7 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
recognized that such contributions might constitute violations of
the federal securities laws.' In conducting investigations concerning the illegal domestic campaign contributions, the SEC discovered that a number of corporations had made questionable or illegal foreign payments, disguising the same through falsification of
corporate financial records.'
As a response to these discoveries, the SEC embarked on a twophase program, consisting of an enforcement program and a voluntary disclosure program. In the enforcement program, the SEC
brought a number of injunctive actions against corporations, in
which the corporations consented to the entry of a judgment of
permanent injunction, without admitting or denying the allegations of the complaint. Typically, in these consent decrees, the
corporation agreed not to make any future payments that would
violate the federal security laws and agreed to establish a special
review committee to review the payments made, analyze the corporation's accounting procedures, and make recommendations to
6. See Washington Post, March 10, 1979, at A-20, col. 1.
7. Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Multinational Corporationsof the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 12, 1 (1975) (statement of Sen.
Church). [hereinafter cited as Senate Foreign Relations Hearings].
8. SEC Report on Questionable and Illegal Corporate Payments and Practices, submitted to the Sen. Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee,
May 12, 1976, at 2 [hereinafter cited as SEC Report].
9. Id. at 3.
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its board of directors.' 0 Intense pressure forced many corporations
to consent to an injunction because, prior to the FCPA, there was
no United States statute clearly applicable to such corporate practices." The enforcement program was criticized, however, as being
entirely outside the jurisdiction of the SEC because the decrees
prohibited substantive corporate conduct and sought regulation of
the corporation's accounting practices.' 2
Being unsure of its statutory authority under the enforcement
program and seeking to promote its traditional theme of disclosure,'3 the SEC therefore began a voluntary disclosure program.
Corporations participating in this program were encouraged to
conduct their own investigations and audits to uncover bribes,
illegal political contributions or other questionable payments. The
investigation was to be conducted by independent outside counsel
and auditors answering to a committee of independent or outside
board members. A final report was to be filed with the SEC on
Form 8-K." By the time the FCPA was enacted, more than 400
corporations had admitted making questionable or illegal payments in excess of $300 million of corporate funds to foreign government officials, politicians and political parties.' 5
Thus, prior to congressional action, the approach of government
was to force disclosure of bribes via the securities laws. The concept behind this was that after disclosure, investors armed with
10. Id. at 4. Corporations consenting to decrees included: American Ship
Building Company, Ashland Oil, Inc., Gulf Oil Corp., Minnesota Mining and
Mfg. Co., Phillips Petroleum Co., Northrop Corp., and Braniff Airways, Inc.
11. The SEC proceeded on the theory that misleading or suppressed disclosure of improper or questionable expenditures could violate § 13(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)(1976) and the rules and regulations thereunder,
all of which relate to the filing of periodic and other reports with the SEC by
registered companies. The SEC then brought the injunctive action under § 21(d)
of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e)(1976), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(d)
(Supp. 1978), authorizing the Commission to bring an action for injunctive relief
in federal court "[w]henever it shall appear ... that any person is engaged or
about to engage in acts or practices which constitute . . . a violation of the

[Exchange Act]".
12. See Lowenfels, Questionable CorporatePayments and the FederalSecurities Laws, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4-7 (1976); Note, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1848, 1853
(1976).
13. Knauss, A Reappraisalof the Role of Disclosure,62 MICH. L. REV. 607, 608
(1964).
14. See SEC Report, supra note 8, at 6-13.
15. H. R. REP. No. 640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
H.R. REP. No. 95-640].
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information concerning foreign payments would pressure the corporation to remedy its practices. Through its enforcement program, the SEC demonstrated that it was prepared to deal with any
corporation who violated what the SEC considered proper disclosure practices. Although the voluntary program gave the impression that corporations were willing to police their own practices, a
number of problems were encountered: (1) the voluntary program
overestimated the power of independent directors and outside
counsel to compel disclosure of payments, (2) the consent decrees
often contained ambiguous language, and (3) because of the inability of the SEC to keep the disclosures reasonably quiet and confidential as a result of the Freedom of Information Act"6 and newspaper reporting, 7 corporations became increasingly reluctant to comply with the voluntary disclosure program."'
The disclosures made to the SEC were testified to in hearings
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in its Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, 9 during the 94th Session of
Congress. In addition, the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs held extensive hearings on the matter of improper payments to foreign government officials by United States
corporations. 0
A number of reasons advanced for prohibiting corporate bribery
of foreign officials include:
(1) the payment of bribes to influence the acts of foreign officials
is unethical and counter to the moral expectations and values of the
United States public;
(2) bribery erodes public confidence in the free market system,
short-circuiting the marketplace by directing business to those companies too inefficient to compete in terms of price, quality or service;
16. Pub. L. No. 93-502.
17. See, e.g., Wall Street Journal, May 2, 1975, at 1, col. 6 (top officials of
Gulf Oil Corp. revealed in secret testimony before the SEC that politicians in a

foreign country had compelled Gulf to pay $4 million in two successive cash

"contributions" in order to stay in business there), Wall Street Journal, March

6, 1976, at 1, col. 6 (Boeing said it paid close to $70 million to sell jets abroad).
18. Y. KUGEL & N. COHEN, GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF BUSINESS ETHICS, Book
I, at 16-18 (1978) [hereinafter cited as KUGEL & COHEN].
19. See generally Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 7; Senate
Foreign Relations Hearings, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 14 (1976).
20. See Prohibiting Bribes to Foreign Officials: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976)
[hereinafter cited as 1976 Senate Hearings].
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(3) bribery casts a shadow upon the activity of all United States
corporations;
(4) bribery creates severe foreign policy problems for the United
States by embarrassing friendly governments when the payments
are revealed to the public;"
(5) bribery by one United States corporation may cause that corporation to outcompete another domestic corporation other than on
the basis of price and quality of goods produced;
(6) discouraging United States corporations from engaging in foreign bribery would improve United States relations with developing
countries, leading to a more stable atmosphere for overseas investment, and promoting United States goodwill.2
Several arguments advanced to justify corporate payments to
foreign officials include:
(1) bribery is an accepted business practice in many countries,
often being demanded by the foreign officials who receive the payment;"
(2) the payments expedite governmental decision making;
(3) business reflects the value of society; attempting to control
bribery is futile until society changes;
(4) regulation of bribery will result in a loss of business to foreign
competitors, rather than improving overall business morality.'4
After weighing these arguments, Congress determined that it
was necessary to alter the behavior of United States corporations
abroad. Some argued that existing statutes including antitrust
laws,2 tax laws,26 securities laws,2 and various other statutes28 were

21. See S. REP. No. 1031, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976) [hereinafter cited at
S. REP. No. 94-1031].
22. Murphy, Payoffs to Foreign Officials: Time for More National
Responsibility, 62 A.B.A.J. 481 (1976).
23. In the Middle East, the "baksheesh", or tip for services rendered is a way
of life and involves everything from getting a telephone installed to signing a
multimillion dollar sales contract. U.S. News & World Report, June 2, 1975, at
57.
24. KUGEL & COHEN, supra note 18, at 2.
25. Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits combinations or conspiracies in
restraint of trade and § 2 prohibits monopolization, attempts, and conspiracies
to monopolize interstate and foreign commerce. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976). Section
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 52 (1976) forbids unfair
methods of competition and unfair trade practices in, or affecting, foreign as well
as interstate commerce. Section 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §
13(c)(1976) prohibits payments in connection with a sales transaction, except for
services rendered. Some authors have argued that if these provisions could be
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sufficient to accomplish this congressional goal. Most of these
laws, however, emphasized the impact of the bribe rather than the
nature of the act being called bribery. A new approach was deemed
necessary to control bribery.
Two approaches were recommended to Congress:
(1) The Disclosure Approach-Under this approach, recommended by the SEC 9 and President Ford's Task Force on Questionable Corporate Payments Abroad: 0
given extraterritorial application, then payment of a bribe by one United States
corporation to assist its sales to the detriment of another domestic corporation
may violate any of the above provisions. See MeManis, Questionable Corporate
Payments A broad:An Antitrust Approach, 86 YALE L.J. 215 (1976); Rill & Frank,
Antitrust Consequences of United States Corporate Payments to Foreign Officials: Applicability of Section 2(c) of the Robinson-PatmanAct and Sections 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act, 30 VAND. L. REV. 131 (1977).
26. I.R.C. § 162(c) denies a business expense deduction for payments made
to an official or employee of a foreign country if the making of the payment would
be unlawful under United States law as a payment to a United States official.
But this does not make the foreign payment itself illegal; it only denies a deduction. See Chu & Magraw, Deductibility of QuestionableForeign Payments. 87
YALE L.J. 1091 (1978).
Other tax laws affecting, but not prohibiting overseas bribery include: I.R.C.
§§ 952(a), 964(a), 995(b)(1)(D).
27. As discussed in note 11 supra, prior to the enactment of the FCPA the
securities laws did not specifically prohibit the making of a payment to a foreign
official. Rather, disclosure of the payment may have been required under appropriate circumstances, but this depended on whether the information was considered "material". Cf. TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438
(1976)(test of "materiality").
28. The Foreign Assistance Act 22 U.S.C. § 2399 (1970) requires firms conducting business under its authority to report all commissions paid in connection
with such busines§ to Agency for Internatinal Development (AID). Concealment
of an improper payment on AID forms violates 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1970), which
makes it unlawful to conceal information on any matter within the jurisdiction
of any United States department or agency.
Firms financing purchases through the Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) must
report to that bank all commissions and fees included in the contract price. 12
C.F.R. § 401.3(c)(1977).
29. SEC Report, supra note 8, at 58-59.
30. The Task Force on Questionable Corporate Payments Abroad was a
Cabinet-level group established by President Ford on March 31, 1976 to conduct
a sweeping policy review of the overseas payments problem and to formulate a
coherent national policy to deal with the problem. The first major policy statement by the Task Force was embodied in a June 11, 1976 letter from Task Force
Chairman Elliot Richardson, Secretary of Commerce, to Senator William Proxmire, which is reproduced in ProhibitingBribes to Foreign Officials: Hearing on
S. 3133, S. 3379 & S. 3418 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and
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(a) companies would be required to make and keep accurate books
and records;
(b) corporate management would be required to establish and
maintain a system of internal accounting controls designed to provide reasonable assurances that corporate transactions had been
executed in accordance with management's general or specific authorization, and that such transactions were properly reflected on
the corporation's books;
(c) there would be civil and/or criminal penalties for falsification
of corporate accounting records;
(d) there would be a prohibition against corporate officials or
agents making false and misleading statements to persons conducting audits of the company's books and records and financial operations.
(2) The CriminalizationApproach-This approach, endorsed
by the Carter Administration, 31 various businessmen, and certain
Congressmen, would impose specific criminal penalties for certain
foreign payments defined as bribes.
Criminalization was opposed by such groups as the Chamber of
Commerce of the United States, 32 the Task Force, 33 and the Ad Hoc

Committee on Foreign Payments of the Bar of the City of New
York, 3 on the following grounds:

(a) enforcement of the law would be difficult if not impossible.
Cooperation of foreign individuals and governments would usually
be required to investigate and prosecute a crime based on acts done
abroad;"
(b) extraterritorial application of criminal laws raises serious questions of fairness and due process, specifically the right to compulsory
Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Appendix (1976) [hereinafter cited as Task
Force Letter].
31. Foreign Corrupt Practicesand Domestic and ForeignInvestment Disclosure: Hearing on S. 305 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1977) (statement of W. Michael Blumenthal, Secretary of the Treasury) [hereinafter cited as Hearing on S. 305].
32. Id. at 185 (statement of J. Jefferson Staats, Chamber of Commerce of the
United States).

33. Task Force Letter, supra note 30, at 23.
34. Unlawful Corporate Payments of 1977: Hearingson H.R. 3815 and H.R.
1602 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance of the H.R.
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1977)
(statement of Robert B. Von Mehren, Chairperson, Ad Hoc Committee on Foreign
Payments, Association of the Bar of the City of New York) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings on H.R. 3815].
35. Hearing on S. 305, supra note 31, at 187.
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process to obtain witnesses and the right not to be subjected to
double jeopardy;"
(c) criminalization would lead to conflicts between the United
States and foreign governments. The use of certain evidence in a
criminal trial might embarrass a foreign government and create
37
foreign relations problems for the United States;
(d) in the absence of effective multilateral agreements prohibiting
bribery, United States corporations could not compete with foreign
corporations committing bribery. 8
(e) the disclosure of bribery to the SEC had already put an effective damper on bribery."
On the other hand, it was argued that:
(a) a criminal prohibition against bribery would be a forceful
statement by the United States against the practice of bribery, thus
convincing the world of United States sincerity;
(b) a criminal prohibition would make it easier for United States
corporations to resist demands for bribes, by citing a criminal provision;
(c) prosecution for failure to disclose bribery, and prosecution for
bribery will often involve the same elements of proof;
(d) since bribery is immoral, the United States should prohibit it
rather than simply requiring its disclosure."0
With these approaches and policies in mind, the 94th Congress
embarked on a search for appropriate legislation.4 On September
36. Critics of the criminalization approach stated that, "[lit would be possible for an individual who has been prosecuted in the country where the bribe
occurred and acquitted through testimony of foreign witnesses given under compulsory process available in the foreign country to be prosecuted under the laws
of the United States without means to compel the testimony of the very witnesses
who had influenced the acquittal in the foreign trial." Hearings on H.R. 3815,
supra note 34, at 72. For an argument that such an approach would not be limited
by the United States Constitution or by concepts found in international law, see
S. REP. No. 94-1031, supra note 21, at 15.
37. Hearing on S. 305, supra note 31, at 187-88.

38. Id. at 208 (statement of the National Association of Manufacturers).
39. KUGEL & COHEN, supra note 18, at 2.
40, Id. at 218 (statement of Nicholas Wolfson, Professor of Law, Connecticut
University).
41, Examples of bills introduced during the 94th Congress embodying the
disclosure approach included: S. 3133 (would have amended the Exchange Act
to require registered companies to maintain accurate records and to furnish reports relating to certain foreign payments); S. 3418 (embodied the SEC's legislative proposal).
A bill introduced during the 94th Congress embodying the criminalization ap-
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15, 1976, the Senate unanimously passed S.3664,42 which embodied
both approaches to the problem of overseas bribery. This bill
would have required registered companies to keep accurate books
and records, and devise and maintain an adequate system of internal accounting controls. In addition, it would have made it unlawful for any person to falsify books or records, or to deceive an
accountant in connection with an audit." The remaining sections
of the bill included a direct criminal prohibition against the payment of overseas bribes by any United States business concern.
These provisions will be discussed in connection with the FCPA,
infra.
Although S.3664 was reported to the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee on September 16, 1976, the 94th Session of Congress ended prior to its consideration by that Committee.
During the 95th Congress, however, the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs heard testimony concerning
S.305 which was sponsored by Senators Proxmire and Williams."
Title I of S.305, in substance identical to S.3664, combined accounting and disclosure provisions with other provisions outlawing
certain foreign payments.'- After making certain amendments, the
Committee issued its Report46 and sent S.305 to the floor of the
Senate, where it was unanimously passed."
In the House, a bill called the "Unlawful Corporate Payments
Act of 1977," H.R. 3815, was reported out of the Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce" and passed. This bill, an attempt to amend the Exchange Act, was in actuality, a criminal
approach to the problem of foreign payments. 0
proach was H.R. 11987. This bill would have amended Title 18 of the United
States Criminal Code to impose criminal penalties upon domestic corporations,
their subsidiaries, employees and officers for bribing foreign officials.
42. S. 3664, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REc. S. 15,862 (daily ed. Sept.
15, 1976).
43. S. REP. No. 94-1031, supra note 21, at 3.
44. Hearing on S. 305, supra, note 31.
45. Title II of S. 305, with certain amendments, became Title II of the FCPA,
"The Domestic and Foreign Investment Improved Disclosure Act of 1977," supra
note 4.
46. S. REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as S. REP.
No. 95-114].
47. 123 CONG. REc. S 7193 (daily ed. May 5, 1977).
48. H.R. REP. No. 95-640, supra, note 15.
49. 123 CONG. REc. H 11930 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1977).
50. See Hearings on H.R. 3815, supra, note 34.
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The two bills were sent to a conference committee. The committee submitted a modified version of S.305 in its Conference Report 5 to the House and Senate. On December 6, the Senate
adopted the Conference Report 5 and the House followed suit the
next day. 3
The "Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977"' became law on
December 19, 1977, when President Carter expressed his satisfaction with the combined disclosure and criminalization approach of
the FCPA. 5
Ill.

THE

FCPA: ITS

MEANING AND CONCERNS

The FCPA consists of three sections. Section 102 contains the
accounting and disclosure provisions of the Act. Sections 103 and
104 prohibit improper payments abroad.
A.

Accounting Provisions

Section 102 of the FCPA magnifies the disclosure approach by
requiring reporting companies to (1) "make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and
fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the
issuer;'" 6 and (2) "devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide assurances that.

. .

trans-

actions are recorded as necessary to maintain accountability for
assets." 7
This section, applicable only to companies registered with the
SEC pursuant to section 12 of the Exchange Act and those required
to file reports pursuant to section 15(d) of the Exchange Act, was
designed to prevent off-the-book slush funds which had frequently
been used to make foreign payments. 3
In reference to the first requirement, the conference committee
51. H.R. REP. No. 831, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Conference Report].
52. 123 CONG. REC. S 19,398 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1977).
53. 123 CONG. REc. H 12,826 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 1977).

54. The conference committee adopted the name from S. 305. Conference
Report at 9-10.
55. See Statement by President Carter, reprintedin 78 DEPr. STATE BULL. 27
(1978).
56. To be codified in 15 U.S. C. § 78m(b)(2)(A); Section 13(b) of the Exchange
Act as renumbered as (b)(1) and new paragraph (b)(2) is added.
57. To be codified in 15 U.S. C. § 78m(b)(2)(B).
58. Conference Report, supra note 51, at 10.
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qualified the "accurate and fair" standard by requiring only
"reasonable detail." The committee indicated that an unqualified
standard might connote an unrealistic degree of exactitude and
precision.5 9 Congress intends that generally accepted accounting
principles be used to accurately reflect the status of the company's
assets, liabilities and equity.
It is a significant development that issuers are now required to
implement a system of internal accounting controls-it must be
remembered that this provision applies regardless of whether or
not the company operates overseas. Even without engaging in bribery, a company must be careful to comply with Section 102.
Management's decision regarding the thpe of internal accounting system to be established will be based upon a cost/benefit
analysis including such factors as the size of the business, diversity
of operations, degree of centralization of financial and operating
management, and the amount of contact by top management with
day-to-day operations."0 As in other areas of the law, the corporation runs the risk that the SEC will apply the standard of reasonableness on the basis of hindsight.
Under section 102, the SEC could bring an action against a
company otherwise immune from suit under the anti-bribery provisions to be discussed below. For instance, although a foreign
subsidiary of a United States company makes a foreign payment
without the requisite nexus with United States interstate commerce, the SEC can argue that the parent corporation failed to
devise and maintain accounting controls adequate to expose the
payment by the foreign subsidiary. Under the FCPA, the parent
company cannot raise the defense that they were ignorant of bribes
made by the foreign subsidiary by looking the other way.'
The conference committee did not include in the FCPA a provision from S.305 which would have penalized the corporation for the
knowing falsification by any person of any book, record or account.
Also not included was a provision which would have prohibited
anyone from knowingly making a materially false or misleading
62
statement to an accountant.
In sum, the accounting provisions must be viewed as substantive
requirements by which the SEC may be able to force companies
59. Id.
60. S. REP. No. 95-114, supra note 46, at 6.
61. Id. at 11.
62. Conference Report, supra note 51, at 10. It was thought this would confuse
the issues raised in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
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to adopt one of a number of different accounting systems. This
section applies to all reporting companies, whether or not the company is making either domestic or foreign questionable payments.
Section 102's effectiveness as a tool for consent decree and administrative action will probably not be fully known for a number of
years. 3
B. Antibribery Provisions

The antibribery provisions are found in Section 1034 and Section 10465 of the FCPA. These provisions criminalize the payment
of anything of value to any foreign official, foreign political party
or candidate for foreign political office, if the purpose of the payment is to induce the foreign official to use his influence to assist
the company in obtaining or retaining business. While the two
antibribery sections are similar in scope and language, section 103
applies to reporting companies and section 104 applies to all other
domestic concerns. 6 The following discussion explores some of the
problem areas in the statute that are likely to be of concern to
corporate management.
The FCPA makes it unlawful:
(1) For any: a) reporting company,
b) domestic concern, or
c) any officer, director, employee or agent, or
d) any stockholder acting on behalf of the company;
(2) to make use of the mails or any instrumentality of interstate
commerce;
(3) corruptly, in furtherance of;

(4) a) an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the
payment of any money or,
b) an offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving
of anything of value to;
(5) a) any foreign official,
63. See generally [1978] 451 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA).
64. FCPA, supra note 1, § 103, to be codified in 15 U.S. C. § 78dd-1, adds
Section 30A to the Exchange Act.
65. FCPA, § 104, to be codified in 15 U.S. C. § 78dd-2.
66. "Domestic concern" means any individual who is a citizen, national, or
resident of the United States, or any corporation, partnership, association, jointstock company, business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship which has its principal place of business in the United States, or which is
organized under the laws of a state of the United States or a territory, possession,
or commonwealth of the United States. FCPA § 104(d)(1).
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b) any foreign political party or official thereof, or
c) any candidate for foreign political office;
(6) a) for purposes of influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in his official capacity, or
b) inducing such foreign official to use his influence with a
foreign government or instrumentalityto affect or influence
any act or decision;
(7) in order to assist such company in obtainingor retaining business for or with, or directing business to any person."7
In addition, it is also illegal for the payment to be made to any
person, while knowing or having reason to know that all, or a
portion of such money will be offered, given or promised, directly
or indirectly, to any foreign official, foreign political party or candidate for foreign political office. This covers situations where consultants or commercial agents are employed abroad."8
By adopting the "in furtherance of" language of S.305, the conference committee made clear that the use of interstate commerce
need only be used to facilitate the corrupt payment.69 The use of
the word "corruptly" 7 to modify "interstate commerce" is intended:
to make clear that the offer, payment, promise, or gift must be
intended to induce the recipient to misuse his official position in
order to wrongfully direct business to the payor or his client, or to
obtain preferential legislation or a favorable regulation. The word
"corruptly" connotes an evil motive or purpose, an intent to wrongfully influence the recipient. It does not require that the act be fully
consummated, or succeed in producing the desired outcome.'
The Conference Report does not address the distinction between
bribery and extortion. The Senate indicated, however, that "true
extortion situations would not be covered [by the FCPA] since a
payment to an official to keep an oil rig from being dynamited
should not be held to be made with the requisite corrupt purpose. 7' 2 Whether extortion will be held to encompass threats of
67. Emphasis added.
68. S. REP. No. 95-114, supra note 46, at 10.
69. Conference Report, supra note 51, at 12.
70. An expert in the field comments: "Perhaps the easiest way to visualize it
is to ask if you would want to read about the payment in the PittsburghPress
and have it also appear in print in the host country. If you don't want it printed,
it may well be corrupt."
71. S. REP. No. 95-114, supra note 46, at 10.
72. Id. at 11.
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damage to physical property or of more general potential economic
73
loss is an open question at this point.
On the other hand, the fact that the recipient first suggested the
payment does not automatically require that the payment be labelled as an extortion fee, since at some point the United States
company would have to make a conscious decision whether or not
to pay the amount demanded.74
The FCPA incorporates a "business-purpose" test to make it
clear that only those payments whose purpose it is to influence the
foreign official or induce the foreign official to use his influence to
affect a government act or decision so as to assist a company in
obtaining, retaining or directing business to any person are
7 5 The issue
prohibited.
here is whether this language will be read
narrowly or broadly. " Must the offer or payment be directly related to a specific piece of business? The legislative history provides no specific answer, and thus, this will probably be an area
of future litigation.
One class of foreign payments that are not prohibited are facilitating payments, or so-called "grease payments." These are payments often demanded by lower level officials who fill ministerial
positions as opposed to discretionary governmental positions. For
instance, customs officials may demand a gratuity in order to
speed the processing of customs documents; payments may have
to be made to obtain adequate police protection. It was felt that
such "grease payments" were not viewed as immoral in many
countries and a unilateral attempt by the United States to eradicate such practices would be futile.7 7 Both the House and Senate
sought to exclude such payments from the prohibitions. This was
accomplished in the definitional section of the FCPA, which defines "foreign official" as:
73. Difficult problems are likely to arise where the company has already obtained a contract from the government, but payment is withheld until a government official in charge of payment is paid off by the company. Arguably, the
requisite corrupt purpose is lacking here on the part of the company.

74. Id. at 10.
75. Emphasis added. Conference Report, supra note 51, at 12.
76. For instance, it is an accepted practice worldwide for businessmen overseas to occasionally present a high foreign government official with gifts of greatly
varying amounts. Interpreted broadly, such gifts may be said to assist the company in obtaining or retaining business.
77. H.R. REP. No. 95-640, supra note 15, at 8.
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any officer or employee of a foreign government or any department,
agency or instrumentality thereof, or any person acting in an official
capacity for or on behalf of such government or department, agency
or instrumentality. Such term does not include any employee of a
foreign government or any department, agency, or instrumentality
thereof whose duties are essentially ministerial or clerical."
Since the focus is on the particular recipient of the payment,"
it might be argued that a payment to a clerical official would not
be prohibited, even where the official performs a function for the
payor which exceeds his normal clerical or ministerial duties.
Again, the House and Senate were silent on this issue, except that
all examples offered by Congress involved ministerial officials performing ministerial functions for the payor.8 0 In all likelihood, in
the event a clerical official exceeds his ministerial functions, the
"business-purpose" test would be applied."1 It should be noted that
the distinction between prohibited and non-prohibited payments
does not depend upon the dollar value of the payment. A payment
which satisfies all other requirements of the FCPA will be actionable, even if the payment is only one dollar. Beyond this, the language defining "foreign official" is broad enough to include officers
and employees of a government-owned business who performed
discretionary functions. Note that in many countries, certain industries are owned by the state.
In what will certainly be the most utilized clause of the FCPA,
it is unlawful for a reporting company or a domestic concern to give
anything of value to any person, while knowing or having reason
to know that all or a portion of such money or thing of value will
be offered, given, or promised, directly or indirectly, to any of the
forbidden recipients for a corrupt business purpose. 2 The clear

78. FCPA, supra note 1, § 103 (to be codified in 15 U.S. C. § 78dd-l(b)).
79. The exclusion applies "[a]s long as the payment is to a person who
" 123
spends most of his time performing so-called ministerial functions ....
CONG. REc. H 11937 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Eckhardt).
80. See S. REP. No. 95-114, supra note 40, at 10; H.R. REP. No. 95-640, supra
note 15, at 8.
81. For example, a clerk has responsibility for processing contract proposals
to be sent to the Ministry of Development. Upon receiving the proposal from X
Corp., the clerk is also given a "fee" to destroy proposals submitted by Y Corp.
Although the FCPA does not clearly prohibit this practice, application of the
"business purposes" test would indicate that a cause of action exists against X
Corp.
82. Emphasis added. FCPA, supra note 1, § 103(a), (to be codified in 15
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intent of Congress was to require United States corporations to
scrutinize more carefully the acts of commercial agents abroad.8
A certain degree of reliance on foreign agents is a necessary ingredient of doing business overseas. The agent makes contacts with the
proper government authorities, speaks the language, and provides
many other valuable services for the company. In fact, many countries require use of an agent recommended by that nation. Because
of this clause in the FCPA, however, it would be a dangerous and
foolhardy decision to allow the agent unbridled discretion in his
dealings with foreign government officials. Safeguards that a
United States corporation may consider are discussed in a later
section.
This clause may cause the greatest uncertainty because of its
"reason to know" language. What specific facts or circumstances
should lead management to believe that their foreign agent is
about to make, or has made a prohibited payment? The legislative
history provides no clear answer. Obviously, a request by the agent
for an unreasonably high fee in light of services rendered may
indicate that at least a portion of that fee is being transferred to a
foreign government official."
Because the FCPA prohibits the giving of "anything of value"
to a foreign official, management must be careful to consider the
effect of "wining and dining" a foreign official or his representative. In addition, the giving of a job to a friend or relative of an
official at the official's request may be considered giving "anything
of value" to the foreign official. Also, note that a technical violation of the FCPA occurs after one offers a bribe, even if the offer
is refused.
The greatest controversies under the FCPA, particularly the accounting provisions, are likely to involve foreign subsidiaries of
United States corporations. H.R. 3815 would have extended the
coverage of the FCPA to controlled foreign subsidiaries. NevertheU.S.C. § 78dd-l(a)(3)); FCPA § 104(a)(3), (to be codified in 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-

2(a)(3)).
83. S. REP. No. 95-114, supra note 46, at 10.
84. Fees would tend to become more reasonable:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

the greater the extent of the agent's obligations,
the greater the extent of the risk to the agent,
the greater the extent of the expenses borne by the agent,
the closer in amount such fees and commissions are to those paid by

other firms in the industry for similar services and under similar circumstances.
1 MID. EAST EXEC. R., supra note 5, at 15.
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less, such coverage was not included in the final draft of the FCPA
because of the inherent jurisdictional, enforcement and diplomatic
difficulties raised by the inclusion of foreign subsidiaries in the
prohibition.8 The conference committee made clear, however, that
"any issuer or domestic concern which engages in bribery of foreign
officials indirectly through any other person or entity would itself
be liable under the bill."8 Also, citizens, nationals, or residents of
the United States could be liable when they act in relation to the
affairs of any foreign subsidiary of a United States company.
In addition, it may be argued that with the required internal
accounting controls, the United States company should be able to
detect any prohibited payments made by the subsidiary. Under
the accounting section, no off-the-book accounting funds could be
lawfully maintained, either by a United States parent or by a
foreign subsidiary whose financial statements were material to the
consolidated financial statements of the parent, and no improper
payment could be lawfully disguised." It appears, however, that
the antibribery provisions of the FCPA would not apply when: (1)
the prohibited payment is made by a foreign employee of a foreign
subsidiary, (2) neither payor is a "domestic concern," and (3) the
payment is not made "on behalf of" a reporting company or
"domestic concern."
The penalties for violating the antibribery provisions of the
FCPA are severe. Any issuer or domestic concern, upon conviction,
may be fined up to one million dollars. 9 Any individual who is a
domestic concern and who willfully violates the antibribery provisions may be fined up to 10,000 dollars and/or imprisoned for up
to five years. Any officer or director of an issuer or domestic
concern, or stockholder acting on behalf of same, who willfully
violates the FCPA may also be fined up to 10,000 dollars and/or
imprisoned for up to five years.9 Any employee or agent of the
company, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, who
85. Conference Report, supra note 51, at 13-14. Foreign subsidiaries are outside the definition of "domestic concern." FCPA § 104(d)(1).
86. Id. at 14.
87.

Id.

88. S. REP. No. 95-114, supra note 46, at 11.
89. FCPA, supra note 1, § 103(b)(2) (to be codified in 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c)(1));
FCPA § 104(b)(1)(A) (to be codified in 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b)(1)(A)).
90. FCPA § 104(b)(1)(B) (to be codified in 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b)(1)(B)).
91. FCPA § 103(b)(2) (to be codified in 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c)(2)); FCPA §
104(b)(2) (to be codified in 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b)(2)).

376

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 12:359

willfully carries out the act constituting the violation, is subject to
the same penalties, but only where the company itself is found to
have violated the antibribery provisions.12 Furthermore, whenever
a fine is imposed upon any officer, director, stockholder, employee
or agent, the United States company is prohibited from paying the
fine, directly or indirectly. 3
The FCPA divides the enforcement responsibilities between the
SEC and the Justice Department. The SEC's responsibilities concerning reporting companies extend to conducting investigations,
bringing civil injunctive actions, commencing administrative proceedings and referring cases to the Justice Department for criminal
prosecution." In the case of domestic concerns not otherwise subject to the SEC's jurisdiction, responsibility for investigating allegations of foreign bribery rests with the Justice Department."
Thus responsibility for all criminal prosecution rests solely with
the Justice Department.
A number of reasons were advanced for this division:
(a) the SEC has traditionally been effective in protecting the investing public by instituting civil litigation;
(b) the SEC is in a relatively superior position to investigate reporting companies alleged to have bribed foreign officials because
of its immediate access to that company's books and periodic filings;
(c) retaining SEC jurisdiction in the case of reporting companies
will avoid costly duplication of effort;
(d) the SEC had been effective in discovering foreign bribery, even
prior to the FCPA;
(e) because some investigations are likely to be politically sensitive, it would be preferable to have investigations conducted by an
independent agency answerable to Congress rather than the Executive branch."
Congress expected close cooperation between the SEC and the
Justice Department at the earliest stage of any investigation to
insure that the evidence needed for a criminal prosecution would
92. FCPA § 103(b)(2) (to be codified in 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c)(3)); FCPA §
104(b)(3) (to be codified in 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b)(3)).
93. FCPA § 103(b)(2) (to be codified in 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c)(4)); FCPA §
104(b)(4) (to be codified in 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b)(4)).
94. S. REP. No. 95-114, supra note 46, at 11-12; H.R. REP. No. 95-640, supra
note 15, at 9-10.
95. H.R. REP. No. 95-640, supra note 15, at 9.

96. Id.
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7
not become stale.9

In addition, whenever it appears to the Attorney General that
any domestic concern, or officer, director, employee, agent or
stockholder is engaged or about to engage in an act prohibited by
the antibribery provisions, the Attorney General can 98
bring a civil
action seeking a permanent or temporary injunction
On the other hand, this division of responsibilities was criticized
for the following reasons:
(a) the investigation of illegal payoffs to foreign officials is at best
only indirectly related to the SEC's primary responsibility to protect
investors;
(b) there is likely to be duplication of efforts and resulting governmental inefficiency;
(c) the Justice Department already investigated and prosecuted
domestic bribery cases."
To date, no Justice Department actions have been brought under
the FCPA.
IV. SEC ACTIONS
In February 1978, the SEC issued Release No. 14478,
"Notification of Enactment of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of
1977." 100 The SEC indicated that a negligence standard would gov-

ern civil injunctive actions to enforce the FCPA. 10 Furthermore,
the SEC contemplated that private rights of action could be
brought on behalf of persons suffering injury as a result of prohibited corporate bribery.0 2 Finally, the SEC indicated that it would
not, on an ad hoc basis, answer questions relating to the scope of
the FCPA applied to particular factual situations. Thus, until regulations are issued, corporate counsel runs the risk that his legal
advice will be struck down by an SEC injunctive action applying
the negligence standard with the benefit of hindsight.
97. S.REP. No. 95-114, supra note 46, at 12; H.R. REP. No. 95-640, supra note
15, at 10. 98. FCPA, supra note 1, § 104(c) (to be codified in 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(c)).
99. H.R. REP. No. 95-640, supra note 15, at 20-21 (Minority Views to H.R.

3815).
100. [1978] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 72,264.
101. Federal appellate courts have never required proof of scienter in any of
the SEC's own enforcement proceedings. Cf. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185 (1976) with SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535 (1st Cir.
1976).

102. See H.R. REP. No. 95-640, supra note 15, at 10.
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Ralph Ferrara, Executive Assistant to SEC Chairman Harold
Williams, has indicated that the SEC's real interest in the FCPA
is to see reporting companies establish independent audit committees and improve their internal accounting controls.1 3 This would
be accomplished through section 102 of the FCPA. According to
Ferrara, the SEC considers its enforcement responsibilities to include administrative proceedings where appropriate. 14 Thus, the
SEC could publish findings, issue orders, and mandate compliance.
If the SEC is most concerned at this time with internal accounting controls, their civil injunctive actions will focus on the accounting provisions of the FCPA. As indicated by several recently
brought FCPA actions, the SEC will use the FCPA in conjunction
with other sections of the 1933 Securities Act and 1934 Exchange
Act in an effort to impose more independent and stringent accounting controls on reporting companies.'"5
SEC v. Katy Industries, Inc. 10-In this case, a consent decree,

we do not have the benefit of observing a dispute over the facts.
We must therefore focus on the settlement agreed to by Katy Industries under the order of permanent injunction. The SEC
charged that Katy Industries, its chairman, and another director
violated the FCPA by bribing an Indonesian official and his close
associate (consultant) in order to obtain a 30-year contract with
the country's state-owned oil and gas company. The SEC charged
that Katy's books and records did not reflect the true nature and
purpose of the undisclosed arrangement between Katy and a Cayman Island corporation owned by the foreign consultant which had
channeled Katy funds to the Indonesian government official. 7
The SEC brought these FCPA charges together with the claims
that the company had violated the antifraud, proxy solicitation,
and reporting provisions of the securities laws by disseminating to
the investing public and filing with the SEC documents containing
103. [1978] 451 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) at D-1.
104. Id. at D-2. Ferrara confessed that while section 103, the antibribery provision has "short-term sex appeal ...

105.

[section 102 is] ...

the long-term shot."

SEC General Counsel Harvey L. Pitt hinted at this intent of the SEC in
[1978] 466 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) at A-4.
106. SEC v. Katy Industries, Inc., No. 78-3476 (N.D.Ill. Aug. 30, 1978).
Discussed in, [1978] 469 SEC REG. & L. REP. (BNA) at A-1.
107. Of interest is the fact that no payments were made under the arrangement after May 1976, well before the FCPA was enacted. Apparently, other facts
and circumstances induced Katy Industries to agree to the injunction.
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untrue statements of material facts and omitting material facts
concerning the foreign. payments.
The district court enjoined the company and the two individual
defendants from further violations of the securities laws, including
the antibribery provisions of section 103 of the FCPA. In addition,
Katy Industries was ordered to establish a Special Committee to
be composed of three of its outside directors to review the matters
alleged in the complaint and to conduct further appropriate investigations. This Special Committee was also ordered to issue a report containing its findings and recommendations including:
(1) a description of the scope of its investigation and review;
(2) recommendations for the implementation of appropriate policies and proc'edures to prevent the reoccurrence of the matters alleged in the complaint and of any additional matters, if any, identified during its review;
(3) recommendations as to what action, if any, should be taken by
Katy for the protection of its shareholders."'8
This report must be submitted to the board of directors who must
act upon all recommendations of the Special Committee. A copy
of the report will be filed with the SEC.
SEC v. Page Airways, Inc. 1O-In this case, a corporation and six

of its officers and/or directors were charged with promoting sales
of aircraft, products, and services by making payments to foreign
government officials and employees and by making other corrupt,
illegal, improper or unaccountable payments. As in Katy, the SEC
also charged Page Airways with violations of other securities
laws." 0 The SEC sought injunctions and other equitable relief.
Charging Page Airways with violations of the accounting provisions of the FCPA, the SEC alleged that between 1975 and 1978,
Page Airways sold aircraft worth far in excess of 8.5 million dollars
to Uganda and established a relationship with that country
whereby a subsidiary of Page Airways operated and maintained
the aircraft at the direction of Uganda's government. The SEC
108. SEC v. Katy Industries, Inc., supranote 106, at 7 of the Final Judgments.
109. SEC v. Page Airways, Inc. [1978] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,393
(D.D.C. April 12, 1978) (complaint in full text); 96,717 (D.D.C. Nov. 18, 1978)
(Transfer of venue to W.D.N.Y., where company's marketing headquarters is
located).
110. Other violations of the Exchange Act with which Page is charged include
sections 10(b), 13(a) [15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) and 78m(a)(1976) and Rules 10b-5, 12b20, 13a-1 and 13a-11] [17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5, 240.12b-20, 240.13a-1 and 240.13a11] promulgated thereunder.
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further alleged that, in connection with these operations, this subsidiary received substantial amounts of cash from the Ugandan
government for expenses incurred in connection with the subsidiary's operations. The receipts and disbursements of these funds
were allegedly not recorded in the books and records of Page Airways. Additionally, it is alleged that Page gave a Cadillac Eldorado convertible automobile to the former Chief of State, Idi Amin.
Once again, because the SEC is primarily concerned with the
adequacy of the company's internal accounting controls, it sought
to enjoin Page from violating the FCPA and urged the appointment of a Special Officer. Such a Special Officer would examine
the books and records of Page and of its affiliates and subsidiaries
in order to render a correct accounting of Page's financial position
and would issue a report to be filed with the SEC. Page Airways,
Inc. has indicated that they will contest this suit."'
2-The SEC charged
SEC v. Aminex Resources Corporation'"
Aminex, its former officers, and companies owned by the former
officers with violating the accounting provisions of the FCPA and
the antifraud and reporting provisions of the federal securities
laws. Aminex had allegedly diverted approximately 1.24 million
dollars in corporate assets by means of false and improper accounting methods. Once again, the SEC indicated its primary concern
was with the inadequate accounting control system.
This case is of major importance because no bribery of a foreign
official had occurred. Rather, the defendants had schemed, wholly
within the United States, to misappropriate corporate funds, receive kickbacks, and receive unauthorized salary. Aminex thus
underlines the earlier observation that section 102, of the FCPA
applies to all reporting companies and acts independently of the
antibribery provisions.
A temporary restraining order enjoined the defendants from
violating the securities laws, including section 102 of the FCPA.
In addition, a temporary receiver was appointed to account for all
of the assets and liabilities of Aminex.
In sum, these civil suits brought by the SEC under its authority
pursuant to section 21(d) of the Exchange Act," 3 demonstrate that
111. [1978] 449 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) at A-15.
112. SEC v. Aminex Resources Corporation, [1978] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,352 (D.D.C. March 9, 1978) (Complaint and T.R.O. in full text); Facts taken
from FERRARA & GOELZER, SAINTS AND SINNERS CONCLUDED: THE FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT at 18 (1978).

113.

15 U.S.C. 78u(d) (1976).
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the FCPA is another tool with which the SEC can require that
reporting companies .follow accounting practices designed to
"accurately and fairly reflect" the transactions of the company.
During the SEC enforcement program prior to the FCPA, corporations consented to the establishment of special review committees to analyze the corporation's accounting procedures and report
to the board of directors and the SEC. Thus corporations which
had modified their internal accounting procedures to comply with
the requirements established during the SEC enforcement program in 1975-76 found few new surprises in the demands embodied
in section 102 of the FCPA.
V.

SAMEGUARDS

Since the SEC has declined to answer questions relating to the
FCPA on an ad hoc basis and no rules or regulations have been
promulgated, corporate management has struggled to comply with
the provisions of the law and the demands of the SEC. While some
members of the business community have demanded that the SEC
and Justice Department provide guidance in this area,' SEC
Chairman Harold Williams has indicated that the SEC prefers to
rely on private sector initiatives with corporate management
shouldering the ultimate responsibility.115
In the area of accounting procedures, the SEC has provided no
specific guidance stating only that "it is important that issuers
subject to the new requirements review their accounting procedures, systems of internal accounting controls and business practices . ...

"I", The

American Institue of Certified Public Accoun-

tants (AICPA), however, has issued a tentative report (Report) to
help corporate management comply with the FCPA.17 The Report
suggests that management first make a "preliminary assessment"
of its existing internal accounting controls and procedures. Companies should also consider "the need for more explicit documentation." 8
In addition, many of the large accounting firms have published
guides to help corporations comply with the accounting provisions
114.

115.

See [1978] 479 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) at A-10.
[1978] 473 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) at D-5.
Release No. 14478, supra note 100.

116.
117. Full Text of Report appears in [1978] 470 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA)
at F-1.
118. Id. at F-3.
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of the FCPA.111 The FCPA is likely to lead to a growth of indepen-

dent audit committees and sophisticated internal accounting controls. Though accounting firms should be utilized in complying
with section 102 of the FCPA, it should be noted that the SEC
intends to dictate more specific measures under section 102 if the
private sector's standard-setting effort fails to achieve the SEC's
desired results. The SEC may require the12maintenance of specific
books and records to assure compliance.

1

Achieving compliance with the antibribery provisions of the
FCPA can often be extremely difficult. Many United States corporations deal on a daily basis with foreign government officials,
usually through representatives and agents. It is often arduous for
the company to determine whether a specific act is prohibited by
the FCPA because of the ambiguity of such phrases as "obtaining
or retaining business," "corruptly in furtherance," and "foreign
official." In addition, it is not necessary that the corporation have
a prohibited act. It is sufficient that it have
actual knowledge of
"reason to know"' 2' that "anything of value"'2 2 will be "offered,
2
given or promised directly or indirectly, to any foreign official."'
As discussed above, the SEC is likely to argue that a company's
lacking "reason to know" of a prohibited act committed by an
agent, employee or subsidiary is an indication that the proper
internal accounting controls have not been installed. A company
may thus avoid the antibribery provisions of sections 103 and 104,
Most of the Big Eight accounting firms provide literature for clients and

119.

prospective clients. These guides typically recommend that management:
1)

formulate a management policy clearly establishing:

(a) business ethics and practices,
(b) objectives and requirements for an internal accounting control
system, and
(c)

objectives and requirements for accounting systems;

2) formulate an organization plan fixing lines of authority and responsibility;
3) organize an internal monitoring group that has access to top executive
management and the board of directors.
120. Ralph Ferrara, Executive Assistant to SEC Chairman Harold Williams,
has indicated that the SEC might, under its rulemaking authority, require corporations to report on the adequacy of internal controls or, further, require auditors
to file reports concerning their client's compliance. [1978] 466 SEC. REG. & L.
REP. (BNA) at A-5.
121. FCPA, supra note 1, § 104 (to be codified in 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a)(3)).
122. FCPA, supra note 1, § 104 (to be codified in 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a)).
123. FCPA, supra note 1, § 104 (to be codified in 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a)(3)).
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but back into a section 102 accounting violation if it is a reporting
company.
The corporation must, therefore, provide adequate safeguards to
reasonably assure itself that its officers, directors, agents and employees do not act on behalf of the corporation in such a way as to
render the corporation liable under the FCPA. Corporations should
adopt their own "Code of Conduct" or "Policy Guide" which, in
strictest terms, prohibits any unauthorized transactions with foreign government officials, political parties and candidates for office." 4 Distributed to all employees, directors, officers, agents and
subsidiaries, such Codes would help assure compliance with the
FCPA.'1 The SEC is most concerned that a diligent effort be made
to prevent overseas bribery. Procedures recommended as evidence
of good faith include, issuing directives to employees prescribing
implemenstandards of conduct, holding seminars to discuss their
12
1
checks.
spot
by
compliance
monitoring
tation, and
Relationships with foreign commercial agents will pose difficult
problems under the FCPA. To safeguard itself from such problems,
the corporation should thoroughly investigate its agent to determine what connections exist between the agent and the foreign
government and to ascertain the reputation of the agent. An agent
who is known to have made bribes in the past or who insists that
bribes are a necessary way to do business in that country, should
not be employed. 27 Many foreign nations advise or require that the
commercial agent be a foreign national; this fact, alone, need not
disturb a United States company, as long as no portion of the
agent's fee finds its way into an official's hands for a "corrupt
purpose." As discussed earlier, the corporation should consider the
size of the fee going to the agent. Unreasonably high fees may
indicate that a portion of the fee may be paid by the agent to a
28
foreign official.'
124. Such "Codes of Conduct" are applicable, as well, to setting guidelines
for domestic activities.
125. One form of such a Code appears at [1978] CoRp. GUIDE (P-H) 236.
126. [1978] 466 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) at A-4 (comments by SEC General Counsel Harvey Pitt).
127. Reputation can be verified by one or more of the following sources: the
U.S. Embassy in the foreign country; the Department of State; the Justice Department; reputable businessmen and government officials of the foreign country;
local banks in the foreign country.
128. One might be suspicious when an agent has requested that the fee be
paid to him in a third country, such as a numbered Swiss bank account.
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One technique that may provide additional safeguards for the
United States company is the use of an agreement between the
company and the agent. Such an agreement will typically provide
that:
(a) the agent shall not give anything of value to a foreign official;' 9
(b) there be certain limitations on the agent's authority;'30
(c) the agent diligently report in writing to the company on all
local developments within the foreign country that relate to the
contract;
(d) the agent fully comply with all applicable laws, rules, regulations and decrees promulgated by the foreign government;
(e) the agent will not make any payment to any person in connection with the performance of the agreement where (1) the identity
of the person and the nature of the payment have not been fully
disclosed by the agent to the company in advance and (2) the company has not authorized the payment in advance;
(f) the agent maintain books and records to record all fees received
by the agent and all expenses, disbursements, fees, taxes or other
amounts incurred or paid by the agent in connection with the agreement;
(g) the agreement is voidable by the company if it determines that
continued performance of the agreement by either party would constitute a violation of any law, regulation or policy of the United
States or foreign country;
(h) there be a right of action against the agent in the event that
the company becomes liable under the FCPA as a result of the
agent's unauthorized acts.' 3'
Such agreements should be disclosed by management in appropriate communications to shareholders of the company and in reports
and other documents filed with the SEC.
129. Such a provision might read: "Agent [Consultant/Sponsor] shall not
retain or employ in any capacity, directly or indirectly, any governmental, political, or other public official or candidate for public office of any government or
country. Further, Agent shall not give anything of value to any government or
country for the purpose of obtaining, retaining or directing business, or influencing government activity".
130. The agent should be prohibited from binding or committing the company
in any way withut express authorization from company management.
131. Even with such an agreement, the corporation may still be liable if the
agent makes a prohibited payment to a foreign official on behalf of the company.
Legislative history indicates, however, that the FCPA was not intended to establish such liability for the acts of "an agent who had run amuck and was not acting
pursuant to corporate order". Hearingson H.R. 3815, supra note 32, at 231 (state-

ment of SEC General Counsel Harvey L. Pitt).
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In summary, management must show that it has conducted investigations concerning the agent and demonstrate that reasonable
32
care has been exercised to avoid violations of the FCPA.
VI.

INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS

Actions by the United States government, acting alone, will not
be fully effective in dealing with bribery until those efforts are
matched by similar action by other nations. Critics of the FCPA
assert that if only United States corporations are prohibited from
bribing foreign officials, then United States corporations are likely
to lose their competitive position vis-A-vis foreign corporations
whose governments take a more benign view toward the payment
of corporate funds to foreign officials.l3 Where a substantial number of questionable payments are the result of demands made by
foreign officials or their representatives, a corporation's refusal to
comply will mean certain economic loss.'

4

In addition, it was rec-

ognized that enforcement of the FCPA would require investigations of the questionable payments. Such investigations would
necessitate the active cooperation of foreign individuals and governments. "Without such cooperation, the difficulties of obtaining
witnesses and evidence to successfully investigate and prosecute
' 35
the case would be insurmountable.'
An international approach is therefore needed to eradicate corporate bribery. An international effort would:
(a) establish standards of ethical and equitable conduct of international business;
(b) provide a greater degree of foreign cooperation in enforcement;
132. Where the agent acts for a foreign subsidiary of the corporation, the
question becomes one of how much control the corporation exercises over the
subsidiary and thus over the agent. Again, this may be a situation where the
company backs into a section 102 violation by not having adequate accounting
controls. To the extent that the parent has control over the subsidiary, the parent
should endeavor to have its foreign subsidiary devise adequate methods of accounting controls, establish corporate policy prohibiting corrupt payments in
violation of local law and the FCPA, and prepare guidelines with respect to these
and other ethical considerations for distribution to appropriate officers and personnel. Comment courtesy of Richard A. Popkin, Surrey, Karasik and
Morse-Washington, D.C..
133.

19 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 726 (1978).

134. Hearing on S.305, supra note 31, at 188 (Statement of the Chamber of
Commerce of the United States).
135.

H.R. REP. No. 95-640, supranote 15, at 19 (Minority Views to H.R. 3815).
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(c) provide a wide divergence of opinions and expertise in formulating an international solution to bribery;
(d) protect United States corporation's competitive interests by
causing foreign corporations to honor an international agreement,
and;
(e) create pressures or impose obligations on governments to vigorously enforce relevant domestic law."6
Various associations and organizations have addressed the problem of bribery. The following section offers a brief discussion of the
work of each of these organizations. Additionally, the United
States' solicitation of worldwide support to eradicate corporate
bribery will be mentioned.
1. The Organizationof American States (OAS). 3 ' In July 1975,
the Permanent Council of the OAS passed a resolution"' condemning "in the most emphatic terms any act of bribery, illegal payment or offer of payment by any transnational enterprise." 3" The
resolution urged that the member states clarify their national laws
with regard to such payments. This document was a statement of
policy, having no enforcement provisions.
2. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD).140 In January 1975, the OECD established
a Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises' to write a code of conduct dealing with a broad range
of matters of concern to multinational corporations. The code of
conduct was formally adopted by the OECD Council in June
1976.11 The OECD code consists of a Declaration on International
Investment to which is annexed "Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises." While only a portion of this document deals with
questionable payments, the general policies included in the Guidelines indicate that enterprises should:
136. Over sixty countries have written statutes dealing with bribery of their
public officials. Many countries, however, do not enforce their statutes, or provide
for only minimal penalties. See generally, KUGEL & COHEN, supra note 18, Book
III, at 6.
137. An earlier and more complete discussion of the work of this organization
appears in Note, 10 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 459 (1977).
138. CP/RES. 154 (167'75).
139. Id.
140. See Note, 10 VAND J. TRANS. L. 459 (1977).
141. Resolution of the Council Establishing a Committee on International
Investment and Multinational Enterprises, adopted Jan. 21, 1975, OECD Doe.
C(74) 247.
142. OECD Doc. PRESS/A (76)20 (1976).
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7. not render-and they should not be solicited or expected to
render-any bribe or other improper benefit, direct or indirect, to
any public servant or holder of public office;
8. . . . not make contributions to candidates for public office or to
political parties or other political organizations [unless legally permissible];
9. abstain from any improper involvement in local political activi43
ties.'
Although the OECD code resulted from a concerted effort by
Western industralized nations to establish guidelines for multinational corporate behavior, the code is entirely voluntary and not
legally enforceable.'1 4
3. International Chamber of Commerce (ICC).11 In December
1975, the ICC set up an ad hoc Commission on Ethical Practices
composed of representatives from both developed and developing
countries. The Commission investigated the extent to which individual countries had enacted legislation to prohibit extortion and
bribery. In its report adopted by the 131st Session of the Council
of the ICC, on November 29, 1977,46 the Commission indicated
that while antibribery laws exist in most countries, their enforcement varies from nation to nation. The report recognized that
bribery is often a response to extortion by a corrupt government,
and thus advocated a "complementary" approach to the problem
of bribery by both governments and the business community.' 7
The report urged all governments to enact strict laws prohibiting
and punishing all forms of curruption. Recognizing enforcement
problems in such laws, the report advocated the drafting of an
inter-governmental agreement on corruption. Specific reference
was made to the United Nations effort, discussed below. Addressing the business community, the report stressed that selfregulation may be the most effective way to eliminate corruption."4
143. Declaration on International Investment, 15 1NT'L LEGAL MAT. 967, 972
(1976).
144. 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT., supra note 12, at 970.
145. The International Chamber of Commerce is "the nearest thing there is
to a 'United Nations' of business". Economist, March 19, 1977 at 88-9.
146. Reprinted in 16 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 417 (1978).
147. "Neither governments nor business can alone deal effectively with this
problem. Therefore, complementary and mutually reinforcing action by both governments and the business community is essential." Id. at 418.
148. Id.
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One of the most attractive aspects of the ICC report is that by
encouraging self-regulation, further government legislation may be
unnecessary. In addition, a self-regulating approach may raise the
public's esteem for multinational corporations. In this regard, the
report contained a voluntary code of conduct, "Rules of Conduct
to Combat Extortion and Bribery," intended to set a moral tone
for the multinational community.' In its "Basic Rules" section,
the Rules of Conduct prohibit anyone from demanding or accepting a bribe.5 0 In language similar to the FCPA, the Rules of Conduct both prohibit any enterprise from offering or making a bribe,
directly or indirectly, in order to obtain or retain business, and
fairly rerequire all financial transactions to be properly and
51
corded, prohibiting off-the-book or secret accounts.
In its "Guidelines" section, the Rules of Conduct encourage
companies to draw up their own codes of conduct consistent with
the ICC Rules' and to establish independent systems of auditing
in order to discover any transactions that might contravene the
ICC's Rules of
Rules. President Carter cited with approval 5 the
3
law.
into
FCPA
the
signed
Conduct when he
4. Need for an International Agreement. In its Report on
S.3664, the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs recognized "that pending multilateral measures are largely
hortatory in nature and do not include reliable enforcement machinery or sanctions for violators. Clearly where countries do not vigorously enforce their domestic bribery laws, there will be little
likelihood that a redundant, voluntary code will have significant
impact."'5 4
The Senate, by resolution, 55 recognized that an international
agreement was necessary to control illicit payments that distort
international trade. Since that resolution, the United States has
149. "These Rules of Conduct are intended as a method of self-regulation.
Their voluntary acceptance by business enterprises will not only promote high
standards of integrity in business transactions, whether between enterprises and
public bodies or between enterprises themselves, but will also form a valuable
defensive protection to those enterprises which are subjected to attempts at extortion." Id. at 419.
150. Id. at 420.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 421.
153. See Statement by President Carter, reprinted in 78 DEP'T STATE BULL.
27 (1978).
154. S. REP. No. 94-1031, supra note 21, at 6.
155. S. Res. 265, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
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actively pursued efforts to draft an international treaty dealing
with bribery.' 5 Such a treaty would incorporate any number of the
following provisions:
(a) enforcement of host country criminal laws;
(b) international cooperation on exchange of information and judicial assistance in enforcement;
(c) uniform provisions for disclosure of payments to foreign officials and agents made to influence official acts;' 7
(d) further definition of what constitutes a corrupt payment, or
corrupt practice in connection with the international commercial
transactions.' 8
Under an effective international agreement, United States corporations would need not fear competition from foreign corporations which would otherwise be free to bribe government officials.
Furthermore, enforcement difficulties encountered under the
FCPA would be decreased. However, as the group of draftsmen
increases in number and diversity, it becomes more difficult to
reach a consensus on details of the treaty. Such a treaty is likely
to be more broadly worded, offering little assistance to businessmen seeking concrete advice.' Naturally, the organization being
looked to in order to draft an international agreement is the United

Nations.
5. The United Nations (UN). On December 15, 1975, the General Assembly passed Resolution 3514:
(a) reaffirming "the right of any state to adopt legislation and to
investigate and take appropriate legal action, in accordance with its
national laws and regulations, against transnational and other corporations, their intermediaries and others involved, for such corrupt
practices;"
(b) calling upon governments to take all necessary measures to
prevent such corrupt practices;
(c) calling upon governments to exchange information on such corrupt practices, and;
(d) requesting the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to
consider the issue of corrupt practices and to make recommenda156. See Hearing on S. 305, supra note 31, at 69 (Statement of W. Michael
Blumenthal, Secretary of the Treasury).
157. Id.
158. CorporateBusiness Practicesand United States ForeignPolicy: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on InternationalEconomic Policy and Trade of the House
Comm. on InternationalRelations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1977).
159. See 51 N.Y.U.L. REv., supra note 12, at 13.
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tions on ways and means whereby such corrupt practices can be
effectively prevented.'60
ECOSOC, by resolution of August 5, 1976, established an Ad hoc
Intergovernmental Working Group on the Problem of Corrupt
Practice (Working Group) "to conduct an examination of the problem of corrupt practices, in particular bribery, in international
commercial transactions by transnational and other corporations,
their intermediaries and others involved, to elaborate in detail the
scope and contents of an international agreement to prevent and
eliminate illicit payments, in whatever form . ... "I"
On July 5, 1977, the Working Group submitted its report' 2 to
ECOSOC. This report reiterated the above mentioned general policies to be incorporated in an international agreement and included provisions prohibiting bribery, providing for mutual judi6 3
cial assistance, and encouraging the exchange of information.'
ECOSOC, by resolution on August 4, 1977,64 decided to continue the Working Group and requested that the Group draft an
international agreement on illicit payments. In July 1978, however,
the Working Group disbanded when ECOSOC established a
"preparatory" committee to advance the work toward a diplomatic
conference to conclude an international agreement concerning illicit payments. The conference is tentatively planned for 1980.165
Of course, any UN treaty that emerges from ECOSOC would still
have to be ratified by the General Assembly.
With no immediate prospects for an international agreement,
the United States has sought bilateral agreements with over a
dozen nations in order to enforce more adequately the FCPA and
other bribery laws.' 6 However, one must have serious doubts about
the longevity of the FCPA in the absence of an effectively implemented international agreement.

160.
A/10034
161.
(1976).
162.
163.
164.
(1977).
165.
166.

G.A. Res. 3514, 30 U.N.
(1975).
E.S.C. Res. 2041, 61 U.N.

GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) 69-70, U.N. Doc.
ESCOR, Supp. (No. 1) 17, U.N. Doc. E/5889

Reprinted in 16 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1236 (1977).

Id.
E.S.C. Res. 2122, 63 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 1) 14, U.N. Doc. E/6020
79 DEP'T STATE BULL. 33 (1979).
Hearing on S. 305, supra note 31, at 69.

Spring 1979]

FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES
VII.

CONCLUSION

Congress' initial expectation that the FCPA would halt corporate bribery of foreign officials may not be fulfilled for a number
of years, if ever. Without a strong ethical foundation supporting
the prohibition of bribery among both businessmen and government officials, such legislation will have little chance of being
effectively enforced. If earlier criticisms are true, that is, that
many societies condone bribery, then the FCPA will be ineffective
in halting worldwide bribery and may only lead to a competitive
disadvantage for United States companies vis-a-vis foreign businesses. If the only impetus of the antibribery movement was this
country's immediate reaction to Watergate, then the Justice Department will bring fewer actions under the FCPA antibribery
provisions in the future. To date, no such actions have been
brought. Perhaps earlier criticisms that criminalization of foreign
bribery would lead to conflicts between the United States and
foreign governments may come true-evidence and testimony adduced at such a trial may embarrass officials of those foreign governments, or our own.
Nevertheless, in view of the tarnished public image of United
States corporations, it may be that halting corrupt practices will
be ultimately in their best interests. The FCPA is a valid attempt
to demonstrate to the rest of the world that the United States
intends to take a strong stand against the bribery of foreign officials. In spite of the often slophy language of the statute, United
States companies now have something to point to when resisting
demands for extortion or bribes.
Many United States companies have demonstrated genuine concern for these problems by adopting codes of conduct, policy
guides, and by more carefully supervising the actions of their foreign subsidiaries and commercial agents. If corporations do not set
their own standards in order to eradicate bribery, the government
will surely step in, and the latter action is never painless.
Furthermore, the need to prevent bribery committed by foreign
corporations must not be discounted and thus, an international
effort in this area is urgently needed. A treaty or international
agreement is the preferable solution. However, the United Nations
seems to be having difficulty approving one. The alternative, then,
is to encourage companies to abide by the ICC Rules of Conduct.
This self-policing approach has the advantage of allowing companies to clean their own house thereby obviating the need for a
formal international agreement.
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As for the FCPA, clarification of ambiguous terms, such as
"obtaining or retaining business," "reason to know," and
"anything of value" is needed. Recall that if a company asserts
that it did not have "reason to know" that a prohibited payment
was made by a commercial agent or foreign subsidiary, then the
company may still be guilty of a section 102 violation for failing to
have an adequate system of international accounting controls.
Without guidelines issued by the SEC and Justice Department,
resolution of such terms will be left to the courts. Judicial resolution, always a slow process, would force United States corporations
to bear the risk of calculating the extent and limits of the FCPA.
Paradoxically, in the long run, the FCPA may not be used to
combat bribery at all. Instead, section 102 will provide a powerful
tool for the SEC, in connection with existing mechanisms, to require reporting companies to make and keep books and records and
to devise and maintain systems of internal accounting controls. In
time, specific requirements will surely be imposed. Aminex, involving no foreign payments, lends support to this statement. During its enforcement and voluntary disclosure program in 1975-76,
the SEC asked for such requirements. Because political and economic factors 6 ' have delayed implementation of sections 103 and
104 by the Justice Department, the FCPA may yet find greatest
utilization in cases imposing specific accounting practices upon
reporting companies.
Conducting business abroad involves numerous risks. A company pursuing business abroad must recognize these risks and prepare for them. Even good-faith compliance with the FCPA will not
insure against the possibility of prosecution by United States or
foreign authorities. The FCPA, international agreements, and the
self-imposed conduct codes of United States corporations, however, may diminish the incidence of corruption in international
business transactions in the future.
Steven M. Morgan
167. Because of the United States' castastrophic balance of payments problem, query whether the country can afford to allow domestic companies to be out-

bid by foreign competitors.

